The deadline for the Libyan dialogue is September 20. So, what will happen beyond this crucial deadline?
The House of Representatives has already laid out its road map with four options of its vision for Libya over the next couple of years.
The first proposal in the House of Representative’s road map revolves around the success of the dialogue efforts and the formation of a unity government. This would see the House of Representatives’ mandate as the legislative authority extended for two years.
The next three options as laid out by the House of Representatives assume the failure of the dialogue efforts and no unity government is formed.
The second proposal in the House of Representatives road-map stipulates that its mandate is extended and a president is appointed by the House of Representatives to assume full executive powers (currently some of these powers are exercised by the House of Representatives). In this proposal, the House of Representatives would go into “limited legislations” mode – meaning members would only work on essential legislations and the president would have the power to form the government and effectively run the country until a new constitution is approved.
The third proposal in the roadmap stipulates that the House of Representatives is dissolved after the appointment of a president who would run the country until a new constitution is approved by Libyans in a popular referendum. This is similar to the current arrangement in neighboring Egypt with the obvious difference that the president in Egypt was directly elected by the people and not appointed by a legislator.
The fourth proposal stipulates that the House of Representatives (or its presidency) declare a state of emergency in the country and hand power over to a Supreme Council of Armed Forces. Again, this would be a repeat of the Egyptian scenario that resulted in Sisi being elected as president of the country.
However, future developments will not necessarily go the way the House of Representatives or anyone else plans or expects.
Currently, there are different competing groups with their own agendas and roadmaps for the future. These agendas usually oppose each other, and will likely result in further polarization and armed confrontations in Libya.
Failure of the current dialogue efforts and peace process will result in the emergence of strong hardline movements and narratives. Most notably, in Eastern Libya a movement calling for military rule in Libya – such an idea would see sudden surge in support if the dialogue process fails to result in a unity government. The armed federalists led by Ibrahim Jathran will also seek reemerge as key players on the scene in Eastern Libya in an attempt to take advantage of the vacuum that would follow the collapse of the dialogue. A more peaceful and civil movement is the one calling for the return of the constitutional monarchy and the reinstatement of the crown prince Mohamed al-Rida al-Senussi. However, for now it doesn’t seem that this idea is very popular, especially in western Libya.
In western Libya, hardliners led by figures such as Salah Badi will dominate the scene and the potential for renewed armed confrontations in and around Tripoli will be very likely.
The failure of the dialogue will present huge challenges for the international community on how to handle the crisis in Libya. Key regional players such as Egypt and Turkey will continue to support their proxies in Libya, which will result in further escalations. The international community, especially Europe, will not have a unified partner in Libya in order to cooperate with on critical files such as terrorism and the issue of illegal immigration through Libya.
The international community and in particular the EU and the United States might find themselves forced to deal with two different Libyas in order to address the issues of terrorism and illegal immigration. One in the East supported by the Libyan National Army led by General Haftar, and another in the West supported by Misrata and the Muslim Brotherhood. Separately, France has been preparing its strategy for the Southern region of Libya (Fezzan). The aim of the EU, US and other regional players is to deal with the crisis in Libya in accordance with their own national interests and that will not necessarily be in Libya’s interest. This would be defacto partition of Libya, paving the way for the disintegration of the country into smaller states.
As mentioned in a previous post, while the fears and concerns expressed by Libyans at the current deal facilitated by Bernardino Leon and UNSMIL – the alternatives can have catastrophic effects on the very being of Libya as a state. The glimpse of hope for Libyans at the moment lies in the formation of a unity government that can attempt to stop the downward spiral out of control, or the emergence of a unifying factor that could pull Libyans together once again – the movement calling for the return of the constitutional monarchy to Libya claims to have these unifying factor in the form of the 1951 constitution and the crown prince.
The next few hours and days will be critical for Libya and key for the future that Libyans will decide to choose for their country.