Scenarios for Libya Beyond the September 20 Deadline

The deadline for the Libyan dialogue is September 20. So, what will happen beyond this crucial deadline?

The House of Representatives has already laid out its road map with four options of its vision for Libya over the next couple of years.

The first proposal in the House of Representative’s road map revolves around the success of the dialogue efforts and the formation of a unity government. This would see the House of Representatives’ mandate as the legislative authority extended for two years.

The next three options as laid out by the House of Representatives assume the failure of the dialogue efforts and no unity government is formed.

The second proposal in the House of Representatives road-map stipulates that its mandate is extended and a president is appointed by the House of Representatives to assume full executive powers (currently some of these powers are exercised by the House of Representatives). In this proposal, the House of Representatives would go into “limited legislations” mode – meaning members would only work on essential legislations and the president would have the power to form the government and effectively run the country until a new constitution is approved.

The third proposal in the roadmap stipulates that the House of Representatives is dissolved after the appointment of a president who would run the country until a new constitution is approved by Libyans in a popular referendum. This is similar to the current arrangement in neighboring Egypt with the obvious difference that the president in Egypt was directly elected by the people and not appointed by a legislator.

The fourth proposal stipulates that the House of Representatives (or its presidency) declare a state of emergency in the country and hand power over to a Supreme Council of Armed Forces. Again, this would be a repeat of the Egyptian scenario that resulted in Sisi being elected as president of the country.

However, future developments will not necessarily go the way the House of Representatives or anyone else plans or expects.

Currently, there are different competing groups with their own agendas and roadmaps for the future. These agendas usually oppose each other, and will likely result in further polarization and armed confrontations in Libya.

Failure of the current dialogue efforts and peace process will result in the emergence of strong hardline movements and narratives. Most notably, in Eastern Libya a movement calling for military rule in Libya – such an idea would see sudden surge in support if the dialogue process fails to result in a unity government. The armed federalists led by Ibrahim Jathran will also seek reemerge as key players on the scene in Eastern Libya in an attempt to take advantage of the vacuum that would follow the collapse of the dialogue. A more peaceful and civil movement is the one calling for the return of the constitutional monarchy and the reinstatement of the crown prince Mohamed al-Rida al-Senussi. However, for now it doesn’t seem that this idea is very popular, especially in western Libya.

In western Libya, hardliners led by figures such as Salah Badi will dominate the scene and the potential for renewed armed confrontations in and around Tripoli will be very likely.

The failure of the dialogue will present huge challenges for the international community on how to handle the crisis in Libya. Key regional players such as Egypt and Turkey will continue to support their proxies in Libya, which will result in further escalations. The international community, especially Europe, will not have a unified partner in Libya in order to cooperate with on critical files such as terrorism and the issue of illegal immigration through Libya.

The international community and in particular the EU and the United States might find themselves forced to deal with two different Libyas in order to address the issues of terrorism and illegal immigration. One in the East supported by the Libyan National Army led by General Haftar, and another in the West supported by Misrata and the Muslim Brotherhood. Separately, France has been preparing its strategy for the Southern region of Libya (Fezzan). The aim of the EU, US and other regional players is to deal with the crisis in Libya in accordance with their own national interests and that will not necessarily be in Libya’s interest. This would be defacto partition of Libya, paving the way for the disintegration of the country into smaller states.

As mentioned in a previous post, while the fears and concerns expressed by Libyans at the current deal facilitated by Bernardino Leon and UNSMIL – the alternatives can have catastrophic effects on the very being of Libya as a state. The glimpse of hope for Libyans at the moment lies in the formation of a unity government that can attempt to stop the downward spiral out of control, or the emergence of a unifying factor that could pull Libyans together once again – the movement calling for the return of the constitutional monarchy to Libya claims to have these unifying factor in the form of the 1951 constitution and the crown prince.

The next few hours and days will be critical for Libya and key for the future that Libyans will decide to choose for their country.

Libyan Political Dialogue – Last Minutes Hurdles in Libya’s Peace Marathon

Leon’s premature announcement that the Libyan factions in Skhirat have reached consensus on a final political agreement could prove detrimental to the peace process in Libya.

It is critical to point out that no political deal is final until approved in vote by both the House of Representatives in Tobruk and the General National Congress in Tripoli.

There remains last minute hurdles facing the Libya peace efforts that could prove detrimental to the whole dialogue process. The General National Congress (GNC) is yet to sign up to the initialed agreement and the House of Representatives in Tobruk is holding a decisive session today, Monday 14 September that will decide whether the members will accept the recent changes to the initialed agreement that have been proposed by Leon to accommodate the General National Congress’ demands.

The last minute hurdles facing Leon’s efforts and the whole dialogue process revolve around the following points:

First, the GNC’s demand for the initialed agreement be amendment to include some of their demands. When the agreement was initialed Leon promised that no changes would be made to the document – this recent change of heart is driving a sense of anger and “betrayal” in the House of Representatives in Tobruk. Some House of Representatives members are saying such a move will take the whole dialogue process back to square one.

Second, the issue of the senior military and security posts in any future government continues to represents a huge obstacle. While the GNC are requesting that the post of the General Commander of the Armed Forces becomes vacant immediately following the agreement and the formation of the Government of National Accord. By doing so, the GNC that is dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood and their Misratan allies are hoping to remove Gen. Khalifa Haftar from filling this post and eventually taking him out of the scene altogether.

This is being met with skepticism from the House of Representatives side. The House of Representatives insists that all its decisions and legislations must stay in place and be valid and only reversed or changed by following the internal procedures of the House of Representatives and the democratic process that governs its work. Some House of Representatives members are saying the agreement does not stipulate that any official will stay in office, and hence any official could be replaced by following the proper democratic procedures when the House of Representatives convenes collectively. The idea of “appeasing” the GNC at the cost of democratic practices is  very unpopular and unacceptable for the House of Representatives in Tobruk.

Third, there are reports that the GNC are insisting on increasing the number of members in the State Council and demanding that it is made up of only those appointed by the current convening GNC members in Tripoli and not from the original GNC make up that was elected in 2012. This is facing opposition from independent dialogue members, as well as, the House of Representatives. It remains to be seen if the various dialogue sides will reach an agreement on these points.

In today’s critical session, the House of Representative members in Tobruk will have to decide how to move forward with two crucial questions to be asked. Do they give the GNC what they want in the hope of saving Libya from its current downward spiral and uniting the country under government once again? Or is the idea of “appeasing” the GNC in itself is just another level of the downward spiral that the country has been suffering from for the last four years and the GNC should not be allowed to get what it wants out of this dialogue process?

What is clear is that both the House of Representatives and the GNC realize that a ‘no deal’ would mean the end of their relevance in Libya’s political scene. A scene that would see the rise of new forces on the ground if  no government is formed by October 21 – such as the calls for Military Council rule or the return of the Constitutional Monarchy. This could prove a driving factor behind a last minute deal that would see a great deal of compromise from both sides that would benefit much more from a “deal” than a “no deal”. Leon and the international community are banking on this for a final deal to be reached. However, there are currently strong lobbying forces in Tobruk that are working to ensure no deal is reached under the current terms and the anti-dialogue forces in Tripoli continue to be in control on the ground.

All Libyans must realize that despite all the justified concerns and worries about the current deal – the alternative is definitely much more worrying.

Sirte – The Libyan City Abandoned by Libyans

All Libyans seem to have found unity in their reaction to the atrocities committed by the so called Islamic State in the city.

While forces from the city of Misrata retreated from the city they once claimed they were “protecting and securing” after coming under fierce attack from Islamic State militants. When Misrata’s forces decided to clash with Islamic State militants, the group responded with car bombs and assassinations in the heart of the city of Misrata. However, following the withdrawal of Misrata’s forces from Sirte and ending the confrontations with Islamic State, these car bombs and assassinations targeting the city of Misrata have stopped. It makes one wonder if there is some sort of an unwritten understanding to avoid each other, at least for now.

On the other hand, forces from Libya’s National Army and armed groups in alliance with it in Eastern Libya around a 100km to the East of Sirte sat idle while Islamic State crushed an uprising by the people of Sirte. Crucifixion, beheadings and blowing up of homes have all taken place, while Libyans on both sides of the city continue to watch in silence or at times looking the other way, as if the city of Sirte no longer exists.

What is happening in Sirte is a reflection of the sad trajectory of post-Qaddafi Libya. Divisions, exclusionary politics and each part of the country pulling against the others. It started with labelling entire cities and tribes as “Azlam” or Qaddafi loyalists and that was used as an excuse to exclude cities, tribes and individuals – exclusion in the political, social and security sense.

Currently, the people of Sirte are viewed by some are “Azlam” and by others they are viewed as ” IS supporters or sympathizers” . The people of Sirte do not seem to have the social support from their neighbors due to the stigma attached to the city of Sirte when it comes to the February 17 revolution. In addition, the people of Sirte are left without any military force to stand up to IS, and they are left without weapons to face up to the IS threat by themselves if they choose. The crushing of the recent uprising in Sirte is a harsh reminder of this sad reality.

According to a leading tribal leader i met few days ago, the democratically elected mayor of the city is now a refugee in the neighboring city of Misrata. His home has been blown up by Islamic State militants along with the homes of others who showed dissent against IS’ expansion in Sirte.

Following IS’ defeat in the city of Derna few months ago at the hands of the people of Derna with the help of Derna’s Mujahideen Shura Council – the group is now working hard to avoid the mistakes it made in Derna and is rolling its unpopular social and religious policies at a much faster pace in the city of Sirte. Currently, all women in Sirte covered head to toe, shops are either closed or have to pay taxes to Islamic State – the curriculum and schools are now under the group’s control. Families in the city of Sirte are now being urged to get their children to join IS camps according to the Tribal leader from Sirte who cannot be named for his own security and safety.

The fact that Islamic State has managed to takeover the city of Sirte is the result of  four years of exclusionary politics, injustice and fragmentation of society and state. For Libyans to stand any chance of defeating IS in Sirte and throughout the country a new approach of compassion, inclusivity and respect for human rights are key. A capable civil society and a strong social fabric are pre-requeisits  for the defeat a group like Islamic State that continues to spread on the principle of spreading fear in fragmented societies.